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NOTES
BEHAVIORAL AND NON-BEHAVIORAL APPROACHES TO
NLRB REPRESENTATION CASES
The National Labor Relations Board justifies its representation
election campaign regulations as necessary to protect employee free
choice.1 In ascertaining whether any impediments to employee choice
were present during a campaign, the Board scrutinizes employer and
union campaign tactics and propaganda to determine their effect on em-
ployee voting behavior.' This behavioral inquiry presupposes knowl-
1. A central policy of the Act is to protect "workers' full freedom of association,
self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing ... " Labor-
Management Relations Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1964).
Furthermore, Section 7 of the Act provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of col-
lective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the
right to refrain from any or all of such activities.
Id. § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).
Section 9(c) (1) states in part: "If the Board finds . . . a question of representa-
tion exists, it shall direct an election by secret ballot and shall certify the results thereof."
Id. § 9(c) (1), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1).
The Supreme Court has interpreted § 9(c) (1) to mean that the Board alone pos-
sesses the authority to determine the steps necessary to conducting a fair election. NLRB
v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 309 U.S. 206, 226 (1940).
The Board's conception of its function is "to conduct elections in which employees
have the opportunity to cast their ballots for or against a labor organization in an at-
mosphere conducive to the sober and informed exercise of the franchise." To achieve
this atmosphere the Board has established and enforced standards of campaign conduct.
Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 NLRB 66, 70 (1962). See also General Shoe Corp., 77 NLRB 124
(1948). Even if an unfair labor practice has not been committed, when the requisite
atmosphere is not present, the Board will set aside the election and direct a new one.
Automotive Controls Corp., 165 NLRB No. 43 (June 13, 1967) ; Dal-Tex Optical Co.,
137 NLRB 1782 (1962); Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 120 NLRB 765 (1958);
Diamond State Poultry Co., 107 NLRB 3 (1953). The NLRB justifies its rules "solely
in terms of need for protecting the voters from improper influence." Bok, The Regula-
tion of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections under the National Labor Relations
Act, 78 HARv. L. REv. 38, 45 (1964).
2. The Board stated in The Liberal Market, Inc., 108 NLRB 1481, 1482 (1954)
that it
must scrutinize events preceding an election, and, when the need arises, must
itself step in and overturn the election. . . . In deciding whether the registra-
tion of a free choice is shown to have been unlikely, the Board must recognize
that Board elections do not occur in a laboratory where controlled or artificial
conditions may be established. We seek to establish ideal conditions insofar as
possible, but we appraise the actual facts in the light of realistic standards of
human conduct. . . . In this connection, we note that a realistic appraisal of
the effect of antecedent conduct upon a Board election must, of course, be con-
cerned with particular acts and their effect upon those of the voters who are
directly involved; it must also be concerned, however, with the overall picture
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edge of employee response to campaign conduct.' In its opinions, how-
ever, the Board often fails to articulate the behavioral evidence supporting
its conclusions and appears merely to speculate on employee responses.4
These speculations are based upon questionable, if not invalid, assumptions
about human behavior.' Non-behavioral analyses which the Board
occasionally uses avoid such speculation by focusing on ascertainable
facts rather than behavioral assumptions as reasons for its rulings. This
of how the totality of the conduct affects not only the voters directly involved,
but any others who may or may not be indirectly affected because they are
within the voting unit.
3. The Board postulates that, if unimpeded, employees will make a free and rea-
soned choice for or against union representation. Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 NLRB 66 (1962).
An employee's choice is free if it expresses his free will or uninhibited desires. Stem
Bros., 87 NLRB 16 (1949); General Shoe Corp., 77 NLRB 124 (1948). A reasoned
choice involves a complex means-end analysis to ascertain for whom to vote. Em-
ployees ponder the positive and negative consequences of unionization, assign values to
them and then vote in accordance with their decision as to which alternative is most
likely to accomplish their end. Note, Employee Choice and Some Problems of Race and
Remedies if Representation Cases, 72 YALE L.J. 1243 (1963).
What the Board says, however, is not always what it does. As one commentator
has said, the Board's election controls assume "that workers are generally like amoebas-
unthinking, unfeeling, passive, and reactive-easily swayed, unable to evaluate, and sus-
ceptible to propaganda, promises and blandishments." Samoff, NLRB Elections: Un-
certainty and Certainty, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 228, 235 (1968).
4. In evaluating the interference resulting from specific conduct, the Board
does not attempt to assess its actual effect on employees, but rather concerns
itself with whether it is reasonable to conclude that the conduct tended to pre-
vent the free formation and expression of the employees' choice. In making this
evaluation, the Board treats each case on its facts, taking an ad hoc rather than
per se approach in resolution of the issues.
33 NLRB ANN. REP. 60 (1969).
5. The hazards of speculation about human behavior were indicated by Lazarsfeld's
sample list of typical survey findings. Readers might observe their own reaction to the
statements:
I. Better educated men showed more psycho-neurotic symptoms than those with
less education. (The mental instability of the intellectual as compared to
the more impassive psychology of the man-in-the-street has often been
commented on.)
II. Men from rural backgrounds were usually in better spirits during their Army
life than soldiers from city backgrounds. (After all, they are more ac-
customed to hardships.)
III. Southern soldiers were better able to stand the climate in the hot South Sea
Islands than Northern soldiers (of course, Southerners are more accustomed
to hot weather).
IV. White privates were more eager to become non-coins than Negroes. (The
lack of ambition among Negroes is almost proverbial.)
V. Southern Negroes preferred Southern to Northern white officers. (Isn't
it well known that Southern whites have a more fatherly attitude toward
their "darkies"?)
VI. As long as the fighting continued, men were more eager to be returned to
the states than they were after the German surrender. (You cannot blame
people for not wanting to be killed.)
Each of these statements seems correct, but every one of them is the direct opposite of
what was actually found. Lazarsfeld, The American Soldier-An Expository Review, 13
PuB. OrIx. Q. 377, 379-80 (1949).
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note examines the Board's behavioral and non-behavioral approaches to
representation cases.6 It concludes that the Board either should articulate
the evidence supporting its behavioral conclusions or, abandoning this
approach, adopt exclusively a non-behavioral approach to representation
election campaign regulation.
THE BEHAVIORAL APPROACH
A statement of the standard by which the Board draws distinctions
between temperate and intemperate campaign appeals can be found in
Storkline Corp.,' where the Board stated that campaigns "keyed" to
instilling in employees' minds fear of strikes, physical violence and loss
of jobs as a consequence of selecting a union constituted grounds for
setting aside the election.8 The difficulty with this standard is illustrated
by its application in subsequent cases.
In General Industries Electronics Co.,' an election was set aside
because the employer's speeches, letters, and posters, when aggregated,"0
amounted to a clear message that unionization could lead only to strikes,
violence, and loss of jobs. During the campaign, the employer stated that
the union "can get you less than you have" and that "the only way that
the union can try to force the company to agree is to make you go out on
strike."" Posters portraying union strike violence also were used."
Eight days later, in American Greetings Corp.,3 the Board found
the employer's campaign references to strikes, violence, and loss of jobs
permissible because they "were factual and temperate in tone . . .were
relevant to the election issues before the employees,"' 4 and had been
refuted by the union." During the campaign, the employer sent out a
letter which discussed a strike in which employees lost their jobs to re-
placements. 6 Accompanying the letter was a newspaper photograph of
two female strikers walking the picket line captioned: "9 Months Later-
6. The focus of this analysis is the NLRB. Decisions of the Supreme Court and
the circuit courts have been excluded from the note.
7. 142 NLRB 875 (1963).
8. Id. at 876. Motives are immaterial. Celanese Corp. of America, 121 NLRB 303,
305 n.8 (1958).
9. 146 NLRB 1139 (1964).
10. The majority stated that it assessed the impact of a series of statements which
separately were permissible in reaching its decision, while the dissenter considered each
campaign communication separately to find none constituted an interference with em-
ployee choice. Id. at 1141.
11. Id. at 1140.
12. Id.
13. 146 NLRB 1440 (1964).
14. Id. at 1444.
15. Id. at 1442-44.
16. Id. at 1442, 1446.
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The Fun is Gone-So Are Their Jobs !"'" The employees also were sent a
letter which asked whether they wanted their "home shot up," "chunks of
concrete thrown through the windows of their homes," or their "auto-
mobile[s] shot up."' 8 In addition, the employer reported an offer by an
insider to "bust up" the union for a price and lampooned the union
organizer's promises by passing out play money."
It is difficult to understand how the employer's statements in
General Industries Electronics are more fear evoking than the statements
in American Greetings. Certainly a letter asking employees if they want
their homes and cars "shot up" and a newspaper photograph connecting
unions with strikes and strikes with loss of employment is keyed to
instilling fear in employees' minds at least as much as posters depicting
strike violence and a statement that it will be necessary to strike in order
to obtain company agreement.
To reach opposite results in these cases, the Board had to distinguish
the impact on employees of practically equivalent conduct.2" The decisions
seem to represent a point at which campaign appeals to fear impede
employee choice. This interpretation would be consistent with the Board's
view that the stronger the appeal to fear the more likely it will interfere
with employee free choice.2 The validity of this assumption is disputed
by empirical studies which show that persons tend to reject strong fear
appeals and are persuaded more by temperate ones. 2 Aside from the
doubtful accuracy of its behavioral assumption, the Board does not cite
any evidence upon which it could conclude that in General Industries
Electronics the campaign appeal interfered with employee choice while in
American Greetings it did not. What the Board seems to do is to
characterize propaganda in accordance with its conclusion without explain-
ing how it arrived at the conclusion. 8
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1446.
19. Id. at 1442-43.
20. See n9te 2 supra.
21. The Board expressed this view forcefully in Thomas Products Co., 167 NLRB
No. 106 (Feb. 6, 1968):
... the more the employer persists in referring to strikes and what they might
entail-replacement, violence, unemployment, walking picket lines, unpaid bills-
the more the employee is likely to believe that the employer has already de-
termined to adopt an intransigent bargaining stance which will force employees
to strike in order to gain any benefits .... Power can persuade and sub-
stantial power can persuade substantially .... When comments such as these
are delivered by men in positions to affect permanently the lives of the listeners,
they are not lightly received.
22. Strong appeals to fear tend to induce less change in attitude than low fear ap-
peals; they may even boomerang. See studies described in E. JONES & H. GERARa,
FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, 459-67, 500-02 (1967).
23. For example the majority in American Greetings, 146 NLRB 1440, 1442, in-
279
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The majority in American Greetings regarded as an important
factor the union's rebuttal of the employer's campaign.24 But the majority
in Storkline failed to discuss the union's campaign in its opinion, although
it asserted in a footnote that it had considered both the employer's and
union's campaign propaganda.25 Nonetheless one suspects, as did the
dissenter, that the majority "considered the Employer's campaign matter
only in terms of selected passages and paragraphs without regard to the
total election campaign." 2 In General Industries Electronics neither
the majority nor the dissent discussed the union's utilization of an
opportunity to rebut the employer's statements. Thus, the union's rebuttal
was an added factor in American Greetings based upon the assumption
that appeals to fear can be dissipated by arguments from the other side.
However, the dissent in this case asserted that appeals to fear cannot be so
dissipated."
The factors which, when emphasized, support the Board's conflicting
decisions are: separate consideration of the various aspects of the
employer's campaign; viewing the employer's campaign as a whole; and
consideration of the campaigns of both the employer and the union,
noting particularly the union's use of its opportunity to rebut. There are
at least two difficulties with the Board's approach. First, that strong
appeals to fear are more persuasive than temperate ones is a doubtful
behavioral assumption. In addition, the Board's inconsistent emphasis on
different aspects of the campaign in different cases suggests that the
Board does not know what factors are behaviorally significant in employee
choice.
On election eve, the union in Walgreen Co."s distributed a handbill
which purported to indicate composite wage and vacation benefits obtained
for all union members employed by the company. Only one group of
employees had in fact received the wage increase. The Board set aside
the election since it believed the misrepresentation interfered with employee
choice. The NLRB argued that wages and vacation benefits are important
terpreted the employer's letter which discussed the replacement of strikers as a sugges-
tion to employees that they think for themselves. The dissenter viewed it as fear evok-
ing. Each emphasized different language in the letter. Id. at 1446-47.
24. Id. at 1444.
25. Storkline Corp., 142 NLRB 875, 880 n.14 (1963).
26. The dissenter believed the union's campaign should also be taken into considera-
tion. Id. at 881 n.20. The majority did mention that the union had not provoked the
employer's campaign by threatening strikes. Id. at 879.
27. Since the majority in Storkline claims to have viewed the union's campaign but
did not consider it a countervailing factor, it seems that the majority would agree with
the dissenter in American Greetings that appeals to fear cannot be dissipated by oppos-
ing statements. Or perhaps the majority did not think the union's rebuttals were strong
enough to dissipate the appeals.
28. 140 NLRB 1141 (1963).
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considerations in the employees' deliberations.29 Furthermore, it was
noted that the employees themselves had no way of learning the truth;
they would not readily question the union's credibility since it appeared to
be an authoritative source concerning its members' wages and the em-
ployer did not have an opportunity to respond to the union's misstate-
ment. 0
The majority noted that, because of the proximity of their work-
places, employees were likely to have had contact with union members who
had received the wage increase, thus lending credence to the union's
claim."' The dissenter argued that this fact indicated the employees
themselves possessed the information necessary to evaluate correctly the
29. In determining whether a message containing a misrepresentation is likely to
have had an impact on the employees' voting decision, the Board considers what was
said in light of all the circumstances. Hollywood Ceramics Co., 140 NLRB 221 (1962).
The Board suggests that assertions by the employer or the union concerning certain
concrete issues tend to have an impact on employee behavior. In Smith Industries, Inc.,
178 NLRB No. 46 (August 29, 1969), the union circulated a handbill which contained
three misrepresentations. The Board set aside the election because it found material the
union's false assertion that it had negotiated a Christmas bonus in a contract with an-
other company since it involved a wage-related subject. But it found insubstantial the
statement that a competitor's employees had received a 42-cent hourly wage increase
which failed to specify that it took effect incrementally over a three-year period and an
erroneous description of a job classification. These conclusions imply an exact knowl-
edge of the impact of particular facts on employees' voting decisions. The results, how-
ever, appear merely to be speculative since the Board never explains the basis for its
conclusions. The Board also has set aside elections where, for example, the misrepre-
sentation involved wage rates: Steel Equipment Co., 140 NLRB 1158 (1963) ; Walgreen
Co., 140 NLRB 1141 (1963) ; Hollywood Ceramics Co., 140 NLRB 221 (1962) ; Gummed
Products Co., 112 NLRB 1092 (1955); the source of derogatory literature: United
Aircraft Corp., 103 NLRB 102 (1953) ; Timkin-Detroit Axle Co., 98 NLRB 790 (1952)
and the amount of union dues: The Trane Co., 137 NLRB 1506 (1962).
But the Board has refused to set aside elections where it decides that the misrepre-
sentation involved an issue unlikely to have an impact on employees. National Waterlift
Co., 175 NLRB No. 135 (May 2, 1969) (failure to include seven-cent cost-of-living in-
crease in wage rates of one company in a wage comparison); Holtite Mfg. Co., 146
NLRB 385 (1964) (union's misleading and inaccurate statements of wages achieved for
its members and of lows which assure that not one benefit will be lost in negotiations).
30. The effect of material misrepresentations can be dissipated by the dissemina-
tion of accurate information since the employees then would be able to evaluate the
statements. In Convalescent Hospital Mgt. Corp., 173 NLRB No. 7 (Sept. 27, 1968),
for example, the Board found that the employer had sufficiently corrected the' union's
misrepresentation concerning wages negotiated by a rival union by disseminating the
true facts. The assumption implicit in these decisions is that employees who probably
have only a high school education or less have the ability and inclination to use prior
knowledge critically to examine and refute misrepresentations.
31. Employees themselves may possess information which refutes a misrepresen-
tation. In Cross Co., 123 NLRB 1503 (1959), for example, the Board expressed the
belief that the employees' familiarity with the employer's seniority and recall policies
enabled them to evaluate the union's misrepresentations concerning a layoff which oc-
curred nine years earlier before most of them were employed by the company. In York
Furniture Corp., 170 NLRB No. 169 (April 16, 1968), the Board held that, even though
the union was unable to respond to the employer's misrepresentations about an increase
in union dues, employees themselves could have asked the union about the issue and,
regardless, could have evaluated the remark as campaign propaganda.
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union's claim. Without any evidence of the actual impact of the mis-
representation on employees, both presumed an effect. The fact that either
effect is possible indicates the inadequacy of this approach. The decision
is not compelled by the facts; indeed, the decision is not based on fact. It
is based upon an assumption as to whether employees possessed particular
information and, if so, whether they used it rationally to evaluate the
statements of others.
In Livingston Shirt Co.," the Board upheld the employer's right to
deliver to employees on company time and premises a non-coercive anti-
union speech without granting the union an equivalent opportunity. The
majority believed that the media available to the union were fully
adequate.3 But in May Co., 4 it held that a retailer who, similarly,
delivered a captive audience speech had to grant the union an equivalent
opportunity. Since the peculiar circumstances of a retail business allowed
the retailer to enforce a broad ban on employee discussion of unionization
on his premises, the majority believed that the normal effectiveness of the
union's media had been diminished."
The problem with these decisions is that the Board does not possess
the means for determining the effectiveness of the media. Lacking such
means it is not surprising that Board members disagree on the outcome
of these cases. The majority in Livingston pointed to the general success
of a union in organizing employees as evidence of the adequacy of that
union's media. 6 The dissenter cited Board experience, union organization
manuals, and law review references to social science findings as evidence
of the inadequacy of the union's media. The majority in May Co.
proffered as evidence its belief that on-the-job discussion of union re-
presentation is vital to providing employees with information. 8 The
32. 107 NLRB 400 (1953).
33. Media available to the union include personal contacts, speeches at the union
hall, handbills, leaflets and other printed material, and mechanical equipment such as
sound trucks. Cf. Id.
34. 136 NLRB 797 (1962).
35. Retailers are permitted to enforce broad no-solicitation rules because the dis-
cussion of unionization on working premises, during an employee's working or non-
working hours, would interfere with customer purchases. See Marshall Field & Co.,
98 NLRB 88 (1952). Normally, such discussions are permitted on working premises
but not during actual working time. Stoddard-Quick Mfg. Co., 138 NLRB 615 (1962).
Walton Mfg. Co., 126 NLRB 697 (1960), enf'd 289 F.2d 177 (5th Cir. 1961).
36. Livingston Shirt Co., 107 NLRB 400, 406 (1953).
37. Id. at 421-24.
38. In May Co., 136 NLRB 797 (1962), the majority said at 802:
The normal effectiveness of [the union's] channels stems not alone from the
ability of a union to make contact with employees, away from their place of
work, but also from the availability of normal opportunities to employees who
have been contacted to discuss the matter with their fellow employees at their
place of work. The place of work is the one place where all employees .... can
discuss with each other the advantages and disadvantages of organization, and
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dissenter pointed to the union's ability to obtain authorization cards as
proof of the effectiveness of its media. 9
In these decisions, the Board gauges audience access to information
by results in other elections, union success in obtaining authorization
cards, and theoretical suppositions. These assumptions overlook the
possibility that, for example, employees might selectively expose them-
selves only to information which confirms their predispositions; or might
interpret information only in conformity to prior beliefs; or simply might
not react to the information received." Without rigorous tools to measure
the effectiveness of media in reaching employees, Board decisions employ-
ing such behavioral standards will at best be questionable.
AVAILABLE SUPPORT FOR BEHAVIORAL CONCLUSIONS
In Pinkerton's National Detective Agency, Inc.,41 the employer told
employees it was unable to increase wages. The union countered with a
letter contending that the employer was financially able to pay higher
wages. 3 In objecting to the election, the employer attempted to prove by
the testimony of a supervisor that employees had been unable to evaluate
the truthfulness of the union's letter41 Overruling the employer's conten-
tion, the Board found that employees could evaluate the union's letter as
mere propaganda.45 On the offer of proof the Board noted:
Such statements by employees, even if shown to have been in
fact made, do not raise material issues. . . . Subjective testi-
mony by individual employees as to their ability to evaluate
statements made by either party in an election campaign is not
controlling; but rather the test is whether on the basis of all
the objective circumstances it appears that the employees could
reasonably have evaluated the statements in question."6
lend each other support and encouragement. . . Where such discussion is not
allowed, the normal channels of communication become clogged and lose their
effectiveness.
39. He stated,
[T]he union had, . . . eight months before the election, secured authorization
cards from at least 30 per cent of approximately 1,000 of the employees, in sup-
port of the first petition which is filed. This indicates the practical effective-
ness of the media of communication which the union had chosen to utilize.
Id. at 808.
40. Predispositions may lead one only to select communications which support his
position. P. LAZARSFELD, B. BERELSON & H. GANDET, THE PEOPLE'S CHOIcE 89 (3d ed.
1968).
41. 124 NLRB 1076 (1959).




46. Id. n.3. [Emphasis added.] See note 4 spra.
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In an earlier case the Board 7 rejected a union affidavit from employees
stating that the employees were influenced by another union's campaign
misstatements and would have voted differently if they had known the
true facts.48 The rejection of this evidence was based on the principle
that postelection statements regarding intent or change of mind cannot be
used to upset an otherwise fairly conducted election."5
Sound reasons exist for the exclusion of testimony concerning the
actual effect on employees of campaign tactics and propaganda.. Employees
may not be able to recognize and articulate the effects on themselves of the
particular conduct.5" Their responses to campaign conduct ascertained
after the election may be affected by the election results. Some employees
may feel compelled to join the side of the winning or losing party on the
basis of the election instead of their actual vote. Employee testi-
mony may be slanted by fear of reprisal or hope for benefit from the
employer or by a desire to assist the union.5 Further difficulties would
arise in gathering and utilizing employee testimony. To obtain accurate
information about each campaign, it would be essential to interview em-
ployees during the course of the campaign. The manpower necessary for
such a task would be enormous. Also, it is unlikely that the Board ade-
quately could analyze the material because of its bulk. The weight of these
considerations forecloses one avenue by which the Board could find sup-
port for its behavioral conclusions.
Empirical studies have been used not in the Board's analytical process
as such but to bolster conclusions already formed. On the eve of the
election in Plochman and Harrison-Cherry Lane Foods, Inc.," the
employer showed a motion picture depicting an unnecessary strike involv-
ing violence, including the shooting of an infant by union adherents.5"
The majority treated the movie as a misrepresentation"4 and set aside the
election on the grounds that employees could not properly evaluate the
movie and the union had no opportunity to rebut its implications.5 After
47. The Cross Co., 123 NLRB 1503 (1959).
48. Id. n.2.
49. Id. This principle had been established in Necco Sales Corp., 119 NLRB 155
(1957), where the employer asserted that several employees had marked their ballots
contrary to their intent as grounds to set aside the election. The Board rejected this
argument because the ballots were unambiguous, the election had been fairly conducted
and voters had not been unduly rushed in casting their ballots. Id. at 156.
50. Bok, supra note 1, at 40 n.8.
51. Id.
52. 140 NLRB 130 (1962).
53. Id. at 131.
54. See text accompanying note 29 supra for a discussion of misrepresentations.
The dissenters did not believe the movie constituted a misrepresentation. Plochman &
Harrison-Cherry Lane Foods, Inc., 140 NLRB 130, 133 (1962).
55. Id.
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coming to this conclusion and although it was analytically unnecessary,
the majority cited social scientists to support the general proposition that
movies have a greater impact than the written or spoken word.5"
In one highly questionable use of an empirical study, DIT-MCO, 7
the Board found no valid basis for the conclusion that employees are
influenced to vote for a union by a promised waiver of initiation fees.5"
Studies were cited which the Board said showed "that the most important
factors influencing an employee's choice are a desire for: (1) higher
wages, shorter hours and an end to wage inequities; (2) protection from
management favoritism; (3) retaining or gaining the fellowship and
respect of those who are already union members." 9 By negative implica-
tion, it concluded that the exclusion of union initiation fees from the list
demonstrated the unimportance of the issue.6" Apparently the Board
failed to consider the possibility that dislike of union initiation fees, as
well as dues and assessments, might cause employees to vote against a
union.
Sound policy dictates that, at a minimum, the Board use empirical
data carefully.6 The NLRB's occasional use of empirical evidence has
failed to validate its behavioral conclusions. Instead, the use of this
material may cast even more doubt on the Board's assumptions.
The major problem with the use of such studies is that they are not
directly applicable to the situation. Existing studies describe reasons why
employees join unions, the general effect of mass media, or the impact
of certain types of appeals.62 The few studies which deal specifically with
representation campaigns suffer from additional problems in methodology
and bias."3
56. Id. at 132 n.4.
57. 163 NLRB 1019 (1967).
58. Id. at 1022.
59. Id. at 1022 n.9.
60. Id.
61. Reasoning on cursory empirical evidence in Livingston Shirt Corp., 107 NLRB
400 (1953), the dissenter also was lead to questionable conclusions. Using secondary
references to empirical data, a union organizational handbook and NLRB experience, he
concluded that the communications media available to the union were no match for an
employer's captive audience speech. Id. at 421-24 and accompanying notes.
62. E.g., Bakke, To Join or Not to Join and Seidman, London & Karsh, Why
Workers Join Unions in E. BAKKE, C. Iaaa & C. ANRoD, UNIONS, MANAGEMENT AND
THE PUBLIC (1960); E. BETTINGHAUS, PERSUASIVE COMMaUNICATION (1968) and E.
JONES & H. GENARD, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAl. PSYCHOLOGY (1967).
63. See Brotslaw, Attitude of Retail Workers Toward Union Organization, 18 LA-
BOR L.J. 149 (1967) and San Fernando Valley State College Political Science Dept., A
Survey of Voters in National Labor Relations Board Elections: Attitudes of Voters in
Collective Bargaining Representation Elections and Political Elections, Los Angeles and
Orange Counties, Cal., 1966-67 (1968).
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THE NON-BEHAVIORAL APPROACH
The advantages of a non-behavioral approach lie both in the origin
and application of resulting rules. The rules are based upon facts or
policy determinations rather than upon assumptions regarding the effect
on employees of employer or union conduct. Application of the rules flows
directly from the ascertainment of a specific set of facts.
A non-behavioral approach was applied in Excelsior Underwear
Co.64 where it was established that an employer must provide the union
with the names and addresses of its employees.65 The Board recognized
that unions lack the ability to reach all employees, an ability possessed by
the employer ;6 that it would be exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, for
the union to obtain the names and addresses of every eligible voter;6
that the only sure means of providing employees with access to the
communications of both sides would be to provide the union with their
names and addresses;"8 and that access to these communications is a
prerequisite to a fully informed and reasonable choice by the employee.69
The significance of this rule is the way in which it was established.
Instead of speculating on the effects of union inaccessibility to all
employees, the Board pointed to the ascertainable fact that the union did
not possess the means for communicating with all employees. Thus a rule
was fashioned whose application follows from a simple factual deter-
mination.
The same kind of rule was established in Interlake Steamship Co.,"0
where the Board held that the employer made a fair election impossible
because he denied the union organizer reasonable access to employees. It
reasoned that the sailors who customarily stayed aboard ship while it was
in port would not be exposed to the union's campaign unless an organizer
could board the ship. Again, the union's inaccessibility to all employees is
an ascertainable fact which, when joined with the objective of providing
employees with information from both sides, leads to a reasonable
conclusion. The Board has avoided speculation about human behavior in
the creation and application of this rule.
An important NLRB policy is to protect the integrity of the election
64. 156 NLRB 1236 (1966).
65. Id. at 1239-40. The Board obtains the list from the employer and disseminates
it to employees.
66. Id. at 1240-41.
67. Id. at 1241.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1242. In addition, the Board expressed hope that the rule would reduce
its caseload by reducing the number of voter challenges precipitated by inadequate voter
eligibility lists. Id. at 1243.
70. 178 NLRB No. 20 (Aug. 15, 1969).
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process. In Milchem, Inc.,7 1 the Board banned conversations with pro-
spective voters at or near the polling place on the grounds that last
minute conversations were unfair to the other participants in the election
and potentially distracting to voters; objections to them were adminis-
tratively difficult to adjudicate; and a blanket prohibition against them
was easily understood. This decision was based on policy considerations,
not speculations about human behavior.
Protecting the integrity of the election also was the basis for the rule
formulated in Allied Electric Products, Inc.,72 where the union circulated
among employees a document that was supposed to be a sample of the
Board's "Official Secret Ballot" but in fact altered the ballot to achieve
partisan ends.73 The rule prohibits reproductions of official ballots which
alter them in any way in order to remove any suggestion that the Board
endorsed a particular choice. 4 The advantage of this rule is that it pro-
vides guidelines to election participants and is easily administered. Proof
that Board documents were used in a partisan fashion constitutes a vio-
lation.
Captive audience speeches within twenty-four hours of an election also
are prohibited to protect the integrity of the election process. In The Great
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 75 the Board rejected the employer's conten-
tion that in applying the prohibition it should measure the effect of the
violation to determine the degree of influence upon the eligible employees
in the unit as a whole78 and not set aside elections because of violations
which had a de minimis effect.77 It said the purpose of the rule was to
provide a preliminary condition to and safeguard for the election. 8 Proof
of violation would be sufficient ground to set aside an election. This appli-
cation of the rule illustrates a non-behavioral approach.
The reasons underlying the rule, however, represent utilization of
behavioral assumptions. In Peerless Plywood Co.,79 a captive audience
speech within twenty-four hours of the election was prohibited because
the majority believed that last-minute speeches by either the employer or
the union tend to create a mass psychology which overrides arguments
made through other media."0 Such speeches were deemed permissible
71. 170 NLRB No. 46 (Mar. 14, 1968). But see Stevenson Equipment Co., 174
NLRB No. 128 (Feb. 27, 1969).
72. 109 NLRB 1270 (1954).
73. Id. at 1271.
74. Id. at 1271-72.
75. 111 NLRB 623 (1955).
76. Id. at 624-25.
77. Id. at 625.
78. Id.
79. 107 NLRB 427.
80. Id. at 429.
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prior to the twenty-four-hour period because the passage of time would
neutralize their effect."s Even speeches within twenty-four hours of the
election were said to be permissible regardless of whether delivered on
company premises as long as employees attended voluntarily on non-
working hours." Distribution of literature and other campaign tactics83
during the twenty-four hours preceding an election were also permissible.84
This ruling assumes that a captive audience speech possesses per-
suasive attributes not shared by other media, such as non-captive audience
speeches, radio broadcasts and personal contacts. But the majority does
not provide reasons for distinguishing captive audience speeches from
other campaign activities; it merely asserts that in its opinion captive
audience speeches have such an effect.
It is possible that captive audience speeches have no greater effect
than any other propaganda medium. In fact, empirical studies indicate
personal contacts are the most influential medium of all. 8 But the point
is that no one knows the effect of captive audience speeches on employees.
In a separate opinion, one member argued that the problem was not
the captive audience speech but the union's lack of an equal opportunity."
He would have ruled that whenever an employer delivers a captive
audience speech he must provide the union equal time. Although this
rule is based upon a behavioral assumption, its application follows from
a simple factual determination.
IMPLICATIONS OF THE NON-BEHAVIORAL APPROACH
The behavioral approach involves costs which the use of a non-
behavioral approach could reduce. The Board's constituency would bene-
fit from clear campaign guidelines which in turn would reduce its caseload,
because presumably clear guidelines would result in fewer violations.
Those cases reaching the Board could be more consistently decided. In all
likelihood, this result would reduce the cynicism expressed toward Board
decisions and enhance its ability to obtain compliance. More decisive
elections would free union and managerial energies for other tasks, and
reduce lost productivity due to uncertainty in plants,8 and might provide
81. Id. at 430.
82. Id.
83. Unions have been permitted to use sound trucks to broadcast messages into
plants. See Crown Paper Co., 158 NLRB 440 (1966). But see U.S. Gypsum Co., 115
NLRB 734 (1956).
84. Peerless Plywood Co., 107 NLRB 427, 430 (1953).
85. See, e.g., P. LAZARSFELD, B. BERELSON & H. GAUDET, THE PEOPLE'S CHOICE
150-58 (3d ed. 1968).
86. Peerless Plywood Co., 107 NLRB 427, 431-33 (1953).
87. Id. 435.




employees with their true choice sooner in the process. Furthermore, the
exposition of clear general rules to be applied to specific facts will aid the
courts in review of the Board's decisions. Examples of this non-behavioral
approach in the areas of temperate and intemperate appeals, misrepresenta-
tions, and access to employees demonstrate the application of the method.
The Board derives its authority to distinguish temperate from
intemperate appeals from section 8(c) of the LMRA which prohibits
"threats of reprisal or force." 9 Using a non-behavioral approach, the
Board could define illegal threats rather than try to evaluate the impact
of a particular threat on employee choice. It is suggested that prohibited
"threats" should include those which refer to bodily harm or harm to
property. Under this non-behavioral approach, the linking of unioniza-
tion with violence in General Industries" probably would not have
constituted a "threat."
The Board's discretionary powers under LMRA section 9(c) (1)1
prohibit misrepresentations which are material and which are not rebutted
by the other side or concerning which employees possess no accurate
information. Considering the materiality of misrepresentations requires a
determination of why employees vote for unions in order to ascertain
whether a particular misrepresentation affects employee choice. The
problem with an investigation into materiality is that the Board must
establish which issues are crucial to an employee's voting decision, but it
does not possess the means of doing so. Determining whether employees
possess information with which to rebut a misrepresentation also presents
problems. First, the Board's finding that employees possess information
is often stated in terms that employees must have known 2 certain facts
rather than proof that they did know these facts. Second, upon the basis
of what employees must have known, the Board assumes how they evaluate
their knowledge and the misrepresentation. The only aspect of the misre-
presentation rule which would not necessarily involve the use of behavioral
assumptions is the existence of rebuttal by the other side. A rule stating
that a misrepresentation constitutes grounds for setting aside an election
unless the opposing party had the opportunity to rebut is based upon the
sound policies of promoting fairness between competitors and ensuring
employee access to pertinent information. It also can be applied with ease
upon a determination of specific facts. Accordingly, in Walgreen Co., 8
89. Labor-Management Relations Act § 8(c), 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1964).
90. See discussion at note 9 supra.
91. Labor-Management Relations Act § 9(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1964).
See note 1 supra.
92. See Walgreen Co., 140 NLRB 1141 (1963).
93. See discussion at note 28 supra.
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the election would have been set aside only if the employer did not have
an opportunity to reply to the union's misrepresentation but not merely
because of the uncertain availability of information through informal
contacts.
From sections 8(a) (1) 9 and 9(c) " the Board derives its authority
to promote equal access of the employer and union to employees. Analysis
in some of these cases" includes assumptions, such as an assertion that
captive audience speeches are more persuasive than personal contacts,
which involve comparisons of the effectiveness of the media used. A non-
behavioral approach would permit access to employees through all media
with the exception of union and employer solicitation and distribution
of materials on the employer's premises during working hours"7 and
opportunity to reply to captive audience speeches.9" Under a non-
behavioral approach, captive audience speeches within 24 hours of the
election, as in Peerless Plywood,"9 might not be prohibited, because despite
the rule's clarity, it is founded on an untenable behavioral conclusion.
CONCLUSION
Examination of the Board's representation election decisions reveals
the inadequacy of evidence supporting its behavioral conclusions.'
In the absence of such evidence and particularly where there is no
statutory guideline,' the Board should not engage in such detailed
regulation of election campaigns. It should not attempt to make refined
distinctions concerning the effects of campaigns on employees. 0" It
should reach only those decisions it can sustain factually.' The costs of
its present regulatory policy outweigh the value of doubtful decisions."0
94. Labor-Management Relations Act § 8(a) (1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1) (1964).
95. Id. at § 9(c), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c).
96. See discussions at notes 32-40 and 79-87 supra.
97. Employers property interest might outweigh any union rights. For rules con-
cerning employees right to solicit and distribute on company property, see Stoddard-
Quirk Mfg. Co., 138 NLRB 615 (1962).
98. The employer should not have to finance the union's campaign by paying em-
ployees while they listen to a union speech. The union has means of attracting em-
ployees to their meetings. See, e.g., Bordo Products Co., 119 NLRB 79 (1957).
99. See discussion at note 79 supra.
100. The Supreme Court has remanded because of insufficient evidence to support
an agency's finding. See Atlantic Refining Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 360 U.S. 378
(1959). The difficulty with the NLRB's opinions goes to the heart of the problems in
the labor field. Bok, supra note 1, at 45.
101. Section 8 of the LMRA proscribes certain unfair labor practices. Labor Man-
agement Relations Act § 8, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1964). Hence the Board must determine
what conduct constitutes a violation. But it need not create other campaign rules under
its 9(c) discretionary powers. See note 1 supra.
102. See, e. g., discussion at note 7 supra.
103. See, e.g., discussion at note 64 supra.
104. See discussion at note 88 supra.
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Exclusive adoption of a non-behavioral approach would enable the Board
to establish and more easily administer justifiable representation election
campaign rules.
THOMAs 0. MAGAN
